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THE PROBLEM OF SUNSETS 
JILL FISCH* & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON** 
ABSTRACT 
An increasing percentage of corporations are going public with dual class 
stock in which the shares owned by the founders or other corporate insiders 
have greater voting rights than the shares sold to public investors. Some 
commentators have criticized the dual class structure as unfair to public 
investors by reducing the accountability of insiders; others have defended the 
value of dual class in encouraging innovation by providing founders with 
insulation from market pressure that enables them to pursue their idiosyncratic 
vision. 
The debate over whether dual class structures increase or decrease corporate 
value is, to date, unresolved. Empirical studies have failed to provide conclusive 
evidence as to the effect of dual class structures, and calls for regulators or stock 
exchanges to adopt prohibitions banning dual class structures outright have 
been unsuccessful, although several index providers have banned dual class 
stock from major indexes such as the S&P 500. 
As a result, some commentators have advocated a compromise position 
permitting corporations to go public with dual class structures but requiring 
that they include mandatory time-based sunset provisions. The sunset provisions 
would automatically convert the dual class structure to a single share structure 
after the passage of a pre-determined period of time. The Council of Institutional 
Investors has asked the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq to refuse to list 
the shares of dual class firms unless they contain a time-based sunset provision 
that would convert within seven years. 
This Article does not take a position on whether dual class structures are 
value-enhancing, but it does challenge the proposition that time-based sunsets 
are an appropriate response to the debate over dual class structures and that 
they should be imposed through regulation or stock exchange rules. To the 
extent that dual class structures are problematic, sunsets do not solve that 
problem. Moreover, time-based sunsets are an arbitrary response to the concern 
that developments such as the decline in a founder’s economic interest or the 
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transfer of high-vote shares to third parties may reduce the attractiveness of the 
dual class structure. In addition, time-based sunsets create potential moral 
hazard problems. Further, because of their problematic incentives, minority 
shareholders cannot address the limitations of time-based sunsets through a 
retention vote. 
This Article observes that event-based sunsets, which have received less 
attention, focus on the specific developments that are likely to erode the potential 
value of dual class structures, and calls for market participants to explore them 
further through private ordering. Nonetheless, it argues that, at the present time, 
investors and policymakers lack sufficient information about either dual class 
or sunsets to justify using regulation, index requirements, or stock exchange 
rules to force companies into adopting sunsets. Last, it argues that, rather than 
relying on compulsory sunsets to evade the difficult policy issues raised by dual 
class, the debate should encompass a more thorough framing of the role and 
importance of shareholder voting rights. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The popularity of dual class voting structures in publicly traded companies 
has increased dramatically in the past few years. Dual class structures provide 
that all the shares of the issuer’s stock have equal economic rights, but that the 
shares owned by the founders or other corporate insiders have greater voting 
rights than the shares sold to public investors. While only a handful of companies 
went public with dual class structures prior to 2010, the percentage of initial 
public offerings (“IPOs”) involving companies with dual class stock has 
skyrocketed, increasing to 19% of IPOs in 2017.1 Currently more than 10% of 
large companies in the S&P 500 index have publicly traded shares with limited 
voting power.2 
The rise of dual class stock has spurred controversy and debate.3 The Council 
of Institutional Investors (“CII”) has broadly endorsed the principle of “one 
share, one vote.”4 In response to concerns expressed by CII and a number of 
institutional investors, several major index providers excluded dual class shares 
from major stock indexes such as the S&P 500.5 Scholars argue that dual class 
creates the opportunity for founders to enjoy private benefits and exacerbates 
managerial agency costs.6 In his first speech as Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) Commissioner, Robert Jackson compared dual class 
shares to “corporate royalty.”7 
 
1 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, DUAL-CLASS IPO SNAPSHOT: 2017-2018 STATISTICS 
(2018), https://www.cii.org/files/2018Q3%20IPO%20Stats.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XBR-ML 
64] (noting that out of 124 IPOs, “23, or 19%, had dual class structures with unequal voting 
rights”). 
2 Madison Marriage, State Street Asks SEC to Block Non-Voting Shares, FIN. TIMES: FTFM, 
June 19, 2017, at 1. 
3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Dual Class Stock: The Shades of Sunset, CLS BLUE SKY 
BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/11/19/dual-class-stock-the-
shades-of-sunset/ [https://perma.cc/DG9C-JDPF] (describing academics and practitioners as 
“polarized” over appropriateness of dual class structures). 
4 See Dual-Class Stock, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, https://www.cii.org/dualclass 
_stock [https://perma.cc/XRJ4-S6R5] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (“CII’s policies endorse the 
principle of ‘one share, one vote’: every share of a public company’s common stock should 
have equal voting rights.”). 
5 See, e.g., Nicole Bullock, S&P to Ban Entrants with Multiple Share Classes, FIN. TIMES, 
Aug. 2, 2017, at 24 (reporting S&P Dow Jones Indices’s decision to prevent companies with 
multiple share classes from joining S&P 500). 
6 See, e.g., Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1051-54 (2010) 
(finding that dual class companies have higher agency costs and reduced firm value). 
7 Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at Univ. Cal. 
Berkeley Sch. of Law: Perpetual Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty 
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-class-stock-case-against-
corporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/2FXJ-UU9G]. 
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Despite the criticisms, some commentators defend dual class stock, arguing 
that it is a valuable tool that allows a founder to realize his or her idiosyncratic 
vision of the company without being subject to the pressure of activists and other 
investors for short term returns.8 In addition, dual class structures may increase 
the willingness of founders to take their companies public, potentially mitigating 
the decline in the number of public companies and leading companies that would 
choose not to do so without the availability of a dual class structure to enter the 
public markets.9 Limiting the voting rights of transient public investors may 
enhance productivity, not just in start-ups, but in established companies too. 
Indeed, outside the United States, regulators and stock exchanges are modifying 
their rules to facilitate greater use of dual class voting structures.10 
The debate over whether dual class structures increase or decrease corporate 
value is, to date, unresolved. The empirical evidence on the effect of dual class 
stock on economic value is inconclusive.11 The results of empirical analysis are 
also subject to fundamental econometric limitations, including pervasive 
selection effects. In the absence of definitive empirical evidence, theory and 
policy have dominated the discourse, and a number of proposals to ban or 
 
8 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 
125 YALE L.J. 560, 590 (2016) (arguing that dual class structures enable entrepreneurs to 
pursue their idiosyncratic visions but expose minority shareholders to substantial agency 
costs). 
9 See Emily Stewart, SEC Chair Highlights Need for More Public Companies in First 
Public Speech, THESTREET (July 13, 2017, 12:20 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/ 
14224963/1/sec-chair-highlights-need-for-more-public-companies-in-first-public-
speech.html [https://perma.cc/7FDS-H68L] (quoting SEC Chair Jay Clayton as identifying 
decline in U.S.-listed public companies as “a serious issue for our markets and the country 
more general[ly]”). As Professor Jack Coffee observes, “practitioners point to recent 
examples of dual class IPOs, which in 2018 included Dropbox, Inc., GreenSky, Inc., Pivotal 
Software, Inc., Pluralsight, Inc., and SmartSheet, Inc., to argue that these issuers would have 
remained outside the public markets if they could not have used a dual class capitalization.” 
Coffee, Jr., supra note 3. 
10 Benjamin Robertson, Hong Kong Adds Dual-Class Shares, Paving Way for Tech Titans, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2018, 6:27 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-
24/hong-kong-approves-dual-class-shares-paving-way-for-tech-titans (highlighting Hong 
Kong’s approval of dual class shares in IPOs which amounts to “biggest change to its initial 
public offering rules in two decades”); Angela Tan, SGX Enters New Era as It Starts Dual-
Class Shares for Qualifying IPOs, BUS. TIMES (June 27, 2018, 5:50 AM), 
https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/stocks/sgx-enters-new-era-as-it-starts-dual-class-shares-
for-qualifying-ipos [https://perma.cc/R7LJ-FVHG] (reporting that Singapore Exchange 
approved first time companies with dual class structures to seek primary listing). We 
recognize of course, that this may be a response to market pressures and the global 
competition for listings. See Steven M. Davidoff, Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 
N.C. L. REV. 89, 102-14 (2007) (outlining competition among global stock exchanges for 
different listings). 
11 See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. 
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otherwise circumscribe the effects of dual class stock have emerged in the last 
few years.12 
The latest policy proposal—so-called “sunset provisions”—offers a 
compromise position between an outright prohibition of dual class structures and 
allowing issuers freely to adopt a “perpetual” dual class structure. Sunset 
provisions provide that, under stipulated circumstances, an issuer’s dual class 
structure automatically converts into a single class structure in which all shares 
have equal voting power. The inclusion of sunset provisions in the charters of 
dual class issuers has been defended as a way of balancing the protection of the 
founder’s ability to innovate with the need to minimize agency costs. As CII 
explains in defense of its support of sunsets: “Since 2016 CII has supported 
sunset provisions if necessary to achieve alignment over a reasonable period of 
time.”13 SEC Commissioner Jackson stated that, unless the higher voting rights 
had a sunset provision, they were “antithetical to our values as Americans.”14 In 
support of his position that dual class companies should include sunset 
provisions, Commissioner Jackson reported the results of preliminary empirical 
analysis showing that the valuations of dual class IPO companies with sunset 
provisions diverged from and exceeded the valuations of those companies with 
perpetual dual class stock, beginning two years after the IPO.15 Similarly, 
Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel present empirical evidence that the 
adverse effects of dual class stock increase over time and advocate sunset 
provisions as a response to this problem.16 
The debate over sunset provisions has focused primarily on time-based sunset 
provisions that eliminate higher voting rights after a designated period of time—
commonly seven to ten years.17 Time-based sunsets are appealing, in part 
because they appear to offer a solution to the empirical findings reported by 
 
12 See, e.g., Inv’r as Owner Subcomm., Discussion Draft Re: Dual Class and Other 
Entrenching Governance Structures in Public Companies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/discussion-draft-dual-
class-recommendation-iac-120717.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSE4-8H9D] (last visited Apr. 10 
2019) (noting “unique” risks posed by dual class structures). 
13 Dual-Class Stock, supra note 4. 
14 Jackson, Jr., supra note 7. 
15 Id. (“Seven or more years out from their IPOs, firms with perpetual dual-class stock 
trade at a significant discount to those with sunset provisions.”). 
16 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class 
Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 631 (2017). 
17 See, e.g., Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 852, 870 (describing 
time-based sunsets as “presumably what most institutional investors and proxy advisors are 
referring to when they insist that dual-class companies must adopt reasonable sunset 
provisions”). 
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Commissioner Jackson and Professors Bebchuk and Kastiel that the potential 
advantages of a dual class structure decline over time.18 
This Article questions whether the current focus on sunset provisions is 
warranted. If dual class is a valuable tool for early stage corporate growth in 
some companies, it is unclear how a bright-line time limit that does not reflect 
company-specific needs makes sense. More generally, much of the discourse 
around sunset provisions is really about dual class stock itself and whether it is 
desirable. Time-based sunsets are better understood as a “split the baby” 
approach19 to the controversy over whether policymakers should permit dual 
class structures in public companies. We believe however that, as with many 
other debates over good corporate governance, a one-size-fits-all approach is 
overly simplistic. Dual class stock may be desirable for some companies but not 
others, and the continued value of dual class structures is likely to depend on 
company-specific factors that vary subsequent to the IPO. The debate about 
sunset provisions should therefore focus on these factors. 
In this light, a sunset provision can perhaps better be understood as an 
insurance policy against a founder whose idiosyncratic vision turns out, in 
hindsight, to be flawed. But a tool that facilitates the displacement of that 
founder after seven to ten years—an eternity in the life of an innovative new-
economy company—seems an inapposite and potentially costly mechanism. As 
explained here, an arbitrary time limit that is predetermined at the IPO stage is 
a noisy proxy for assessing the desirability of retaining the dual class structure. 
Rather, we identify several particular issuer-specific developments that 
potentially erode the desirability of dual class. The most important of these 
developments are substantial dilution of the founder’s stake; transfer of high 
voting stock to a non-founder; and death, incapacitation, or departure of the 
founder. Obviously, the passage of time increases the potential for these 
developments but, as argued here, it is these developments, and not time alone, 
that are critical for the continued effectiveness of dual class. To the extent sunset 
provisions are warranted, they should incorporate these developments, and any 
regulatory effort should be similarly focused. 
This Article further challenges the claim that the potential downside of 
mandatory time-based sunsets can be remedied by enabling shareholders to vote 
to extend the dual class structure beyond the sunset deadline.20 Although in 
 
18 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 630 (“[C]ontrollers have perverse 
incentives to retain dual-class structures even when those structures become substantially 
inefficient.”). 
19 Splitting the baby refers to the Biblical telling of the Judgement of King Solomon. 1 
Kings 3:16-28. 
20 See, e.g., Letter from Ash Williams, Chair, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Ken Bertsch, 
Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, & Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of 
Institutional Inv’rs, to Elizabeth King, Chief Regulatory Officer, Intercontinental Exch. Inc. 
5 (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/2018/2018 
1024%20NYSE%20Petition%20on%20Multiclass%20Sunsets%20FINAL.pdf [https://perm 
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theory shareholders should vote to retain dual class structures in situations in 
which enhanced founder control is value-enhancing, this Article questions 
whether the institutional investors who would control such a voting decision 
would have the appropriate incentives to vote to retain the dual class structure. 
It similarly highlights the perverse incentives that a time-based sunset creates 
for those who hold high vote stock. 
This Article attempts to reorder the debate over dual class stock, positing that 
dual class stock responds to the evolving reality of capital market structure in 
the United States and the world. In certain circumstances, dual class stock may 
be appropriate for certain companies, particularly at the IPO stage, but in others 
it is not. As the private capital markets have expanded, new companies are no 
longer compelled to seek capital from public investors. The reduced market 
power of public investors requires them, in some cases, to accept a diminished 
voice in exchange for a broader range of investment opportunities. Sunsets 
reflect our discomfort with this shift in the balance of power, but it is unclear 
that, given the current ownership structure of public companies,21 sunsets are the 
right tool to address dual class concerns. Instead, we should better frame what is 
at stake in the debate over voting rights. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Dual Class and Its Variants 
Dual class stock refers to a capital structure in which shares of an issuer’s 
common stock with equal economic rights differ with respect to their relative 
voting power. The common stock22 in a dual class company is divided into two 
or more classes, in which the shares with more voting power are typically 
described as high vote stock, and the shares with less voting power are described 
as low vote stock. The precise ratio of voting power varies, but it is common for 
high vote shares to have ten times the voting power of low vote shares.23 Some 
 
a.cc/5TCV-FY7M] (proposing that issuers with dual class structure be required to have a 
mandatory sunset provision of seven years or less, but that issuers be permitted to allow 
shareholders to vote to retain dual class structure). 
21 See Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Passive Investors 17 
(European Corp. Governance Inst., Research Paper No. 414, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3192069 [https://perma.cc/7DAT-GCZX] (identifying 
increasingly concentrated ownership of public companies by passive investors and potential 
consequences of this concentration). 
22 Dual class common stock is a different capital structure than having both preferred and 
common stock. Common stock has different economic rights from preferred stock, as well as 
different voting rights. Preferred stockholders typically have reduced or nonexistent voting 
rights and instead have greater rights with respect to dividend payments or liquidation 
preferences. 
23 Dual-Class Stock, supra at note 4 (“The ratio most frequently employed is 10 votes per 
superior share to one vote per inferior share.”). 
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issuers may have a third class of stock with no voting rights at all.24 Due to stock 
exchange restrictions, dual class structures must be implemented at the IPO stage 
and midstream adoptions are prohibited.25 
Founders or other early stage investors use dual class stock to retain control 
of the firm. At the time of the IPO, the founders or other early stage investors 
retain high vote shares, and the low vote shares are issued to public investors.26 
The key advantage offered by the dual class structure is that it enables those who 
own the high vote shares to divest a substantial portion of their economic stake 
without losing voting control. Dual class stock thus cements control of the firm 
with a core group of investors for an extended, and historically an indeterminate 
period of time. 
B. The Rise of Dual Class 
The modern use of dual class stock dates back to 1976. In that year, Wang 
Laboratories listed using dual class on the American Stock Exchange 
(“AMEX”).27 The listing was controversial, and at the time barred by the New 
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).28 AMEX allowed the listing, but only under 
 
24 See Ken Bertsch, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common 
Shares, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 26, 2017), https://corpgov 
.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/ [https://perma.c 
c/P6Q4-QKTJ] (“With NYSE-listed Snap’s arrival with ‘zero’ rights for public shareholders, 
perhaps the bottom has been reached.”); Eric Jhonsa, Zillow Plans To Issue Non-Voting Class 
C Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (July 21, 2015, 9:54 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/news/2643935 
-zillow-plans-to-issue-non-voting-class-c-shares [https://perma.cc/W9E5-N82F] (reporting 
that Zillow created “Class C shares that carry no voting rights”); Floyd Norris, The Many 
Classes of Google Stock, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX (Apr. 2, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://economix 
.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/the-many-classes-of-google-stock/ [https://perma.cc/5PTX-
TEU6] (describing issuance of Class C shares in Google that have no voting rights). 
25 See Michael A. Hiltzik, NYSE Decides to End Its One-Share, One-Vote Standard, L.A. 
TIMES, July 4, 1986, at BUS1. 
26 Although dual class can be used in private companies, venture capital (“VC”)-funded 
issuers are more likely to use capital structures in which different classes of securities have 
varying economic rights. It does appear, however, that some VC-funded companies are 
adopting dual class structures prior to the IPO. See, e.g., Julia Boorstin, Facebook’s New Dual 
Class Structure - Slow Steps to an IPO, CNBC (Mar. 18, 2010, 12:19 AM), https://www.cnbc. 
com/id/34134917 [https://perma.cc/7H77-T53N] (citing Facebook and Google’s adoption of 
dual class structures prior to their IPOs). In addition, some significant private companies have 
eliminated dual class structures—Uber is the most notable example. See Mike Issac, Uber 
Shareholders Including Kalanick Loosen Grip With Sales of Stock, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 15, 2018, 
at B2 (explaining Uber’s plan to eliminate its “super voting shares”). 
27 Winden, supra note 17, at 864-65. 
28 Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common 
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 699 (1986) (reporting that NYSE 
banned dual class stocks entirely in 1940); Winden, supra note 17, at 864 (noting that NYSE 
generally prohibited dual class structures from mid-1920s until mid-1980s). 
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terms designed to ameliorate the impact of the high vote stock.29 These terms 
included a requirement that the low vote holders be permitted to elect 25% of 
the company’s directors to the board.30 The Wang Laboratories IPO triggered a 
spate of dual class listings at the IPO stage that continued until the 2000s.31 
In 1986, in response to an effort by General Motors to retain a dual class 
structure—a structure that was then-barred under the listing requirements of the 
NYSE—in connection with its acquisitions of Electronic Data Systems and 
Hughes Aircraft, the NYSE voted to eliminate a sixty-year old rule that imposed 
a one-share/one-vote standard on all listed companies.32 The NYSE rule change 
required SEC approval and, in 1988, rather than approving the proposed rule 
change, the SEC adopted Rule 19c-4 which, for the most part, prohibited the 
creation of dual class voting structures.33 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit struck down the rule as beyond the scope of the SEC’s rulemaking 
authority.34 
In the wake of the court’s decision, the stock exchanges adopted rules that 
allowed dual class stock, but only if it was issued at the IPO stage.35 For a 
number of years following these rule changes, use of dual class structures was 
limited to “businesses, media companies seeking to ensure their publications 
could maintain journalistic editorial independence, or other companies led by a 
strong group of insiders.”36 
 
29 Id. (explaining that these terms became known as “the Wang Formula”). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 865 (“At least twenty-two other companies followed the Wang formula with initial 
public offerings on the AMEX and seven more recapitalized into dual-class structures 
according to the Wang formula.”). 
32 Hiltzik, supra note 25 (reporting that NYSE rule change was intended to allow NYSE 
to compete with exchanges with more relaxed rules). 
33 Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 
(1990). The rule contained variations exemptions and did not apply to existing issues. See 
Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Court Overturns S.E.C. Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1990, at D1 
(describing SEC’s response to General Motors’s request). 
34 Bus. Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 409-16 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See 
generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 
WASH. U. L. REV. 565 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock 
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1, 69-75 (1988). 
35 See Proposed Rule Changes by NYSE, AMEX and National Association of Security 
Dealers, Inc., Relating to the Exchanges’ and Association’s Rules Regarding Shareholder 
Voting Rights, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,614 (Aug. 11, 1994). Technically, the rule prohibits mid-
stream issuances that have the effect of reducing the voting rights of existing shareholders. 
36 David J. Berger & Laurie Simon Hodrick, Are Dual-Class Companies Harmful to 
Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 15, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/15/are-
dual-class-companies-harmful-to-stockholders-a-preliminary-review-of-the-evidence/ 
[https://perma.cc/R59V-8PLH]. 
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The recent boom in dual class stock began with the 2004 IPO of Google. 
Google went public using a high vote (ten votes to one) common share option 
designed to preserve control with the founders Sergey Brin and Larry Paige.37 
The rationale provided at the time was spelled out in a letter to shareholders. 
Brin and Paige wrote that: 
In the transition to public ownership, we have set up a corporate structure 
that will make it harder for outside parties to take over or influence Google. 
This structure will also make it easier for our management team to follow 
the long term, innovative approach . . . .  
. . . . 
Google has prospered as a private company. We believe a dual class voting 
structure will enable Google, as a public company, to retain many of the 
positive aspects of being private.38 
The Google founders specifically noted that dual class stock was rarely used 
in technology companies at the time.39 But Google opened the floodgates, and 
thereafter, dual class stock has become a norm for technology companies.40  
 
37 Google Inc., Registration Statement (Amend. No. 9 to Form S-1), at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004). 
38 Id. at 29-30. 
39 See id. at 30. 
40 See Berger & Hodrick, supra note 36 (“Since 2010, there have been an increasing 
number of technology companies going public with dual-class (or multi-class) share 
structures.”). 
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Figure 1. Number of Dual Class Listings as a Percentage of U.S. IPOs (five year 
moving average).41 
 
 
Facebook, Linkedin, and Snap have all undertaken IPOs with dual class 
listings.42 And, so far in early 2019, IPOs of technology companies Lyft, 
Pinterest and Zoom have gone public with dual class stock.43 In all, about half 
of dual class share listings since the Google IPO are of technology companies.44 
Indeed, so common is dual class stock that when Twitter went public without it, 
 
41 Figure 1 sets forth figures compiled by Professor Jay Ritter on the rise of dual class 
stock in IPOs. Inv’r as Owner Subcomm., supra note 12, at 1 (citing Jay R. Ritter, IPOs from 
1980 – 2016 with Multiple Share Classes Outstanding, WARRINGTON C. BUS., https://site. 
warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2017/01/IPOs-from-1980-2016-with-Multiple-Share-Classes-
Outstanding.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QWB-Y2F9] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019)). 
42 Benjamin Robertson & Andrea Tan, Dual Class Shares: Second-Class Investors?, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 14, 2019, 9:25 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/dual-class-
shares (noting that Facebook, LinkedIn, and Snap, among others, have all gone public with 
dual class structures). 
43 See Rani Molla, More Tech Companies Are Selling Stock That Keeps Their Founders in 
Power, RECODE (Apr. 11, 2019, 10:14 AM), https://www.recode.net/2019/4/11/18302102/ 
ipo-voting-multi-dual-stock-lyft-pinterest. 
44 Steven Davidoff Solomon, Shareholders Vote with Their Dollars to Have Less of a Say, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/05/business/ 
dealbook/shareholders-vote-with-their-dollars-to-have-less-of-a-say.html (“More than 13.5 
percent of the 133 companies listing shares on United States exchanges in 2015 have set up a 
dual-class structure . . . . About half the companies choosing the structure were in the 
technology industry.”). 
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a front page news article in the business section of the New York Times explicitly 
highlighted it.45 More recently, CII reports that, in 2017, 19% of IPO companies 
had dual class structures.46 Dual class structures are also common outside the 
United States.47 
The reasons postulated for the increasing use of dual class stock vary. They 
include protection of the founder’s vision from divergent, less capable interests; 
simple entrenchment;48 the need for technology companies to respond to greater 
information asymmetries;49 and the desire to stem short-termist interests in the 
capital markets.50 While the reasons vary, they are often summarized as the 
Google founders did—as a tool to insulate the founder and the board from people 
(i.e., investors) who will question, critique, or impede the founder’s vision.51 
Dual class is most commonly defended as providing thick insulation of the 
company from outside, perhaps value-destructive, interests. 
Whatever the reason, today dual class structures are not just the purview of 
technology companies. The media industry has long utilized a dual class 
structure to protect themselves from investors who might limit their journalistic 
integrity.52 And as dual class has become more common, it has been utilized by 
clothing manufacturers, grocery stores, hamburger chains, and various other 
 
45 Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Twitter’s I.P.O. Filing, Signs of a Start-Up That Has 
Matured, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 8, 2013, 4:33 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/08/in-twitters-i-p-o-filing-signs-of-a-start-up-that-has-matured/ (“Twitter surprised 
many by electing to maintain a more traditional corporate governance structure, spurning the 
dual-class shares that are in favor with technology companies because they give the founders 
control of the company.”). 
46 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 1, at 1. 
47 See, e.g., Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical 
Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 55 (2008) (“Multiple-voting shares are common in Sweden (59%), 
France (58%) and the Netherlands (41%) . . . .”); Anita Anand, Governance Complexities in 
Firms with Dual Class Shares, 3 ANNALS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE 184, 190 (2018) (“In 
Canada, the list of DCS firms includes icons of the Canadian corporate establishment: 
Bombardier, Power Corp., Rogers Communications, Onex and Canadian Tire.”). 
48 See, e.g., Winden, supra note 17, at 903 (identifying potential of dual class structures to 
“entrench the entrepreneur in control of the company”). 
49 Id. at 890, 891 n.103 (observing that “entrepreneurs naturally have information about 
their businesses that they are not able to make public for competitive reasons”). 
50 Warren E. Buffett, Chairman’s Letter, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. (Feb. 28, 1997), 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1996.html [https://perma.cc/VC9D-TTN2] 
(explaining that creation of Class B stock was to prevent “a speculative bubble in [Berkshire 
Hathaway] stock”). 
51 See Larry Page & Sergey Brin, 2004 Founders’ IPO Letter, ALPHABET (2004), 
https://abc.xyz/investor/founders-letters/2004/ipo-letter.html [https://perma.cc/LK3W-
A8VN] (“We have implemented a corporate structure that is designed to protect Google’s 
ability to innovate and retain its most distinctive characteristics.”). 
52 See, e.g., Ava Seave, 45 Media Companies Where Investors Are Flying Second Class, 
FORBES (Oct. 21, 2013, 5:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/avaseave/2013/10/21/45-
media-companies-where-investors-are-flying-second-class/ [https://perma.cc/6AQ9-3U6L]. 
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companies across industries.53 Figure 1 shows that from 2005 to 2015, the 
number of IPOs employing dual class stock rose by 44%. Dual class has also 
spread to other countries. A 2017 study found that 24% of companies in a sample 
involving sixteen European countries had a dual class structure.54 
C. The Debate over Dual Class 
The widespread use of dual class stock in a variety of different industries has 
sparked a furious debate over its efficacy. This debate has been carried out both 
in academia and public forums and has been shaped by a developing, yet to date 
inconclusive, body of empirical evidence.55 
1. Empirical Evidence 
As an initial matter, some academics have argued that the IPO market offers 
a sufficient constraint on the inefficient use of the dual class structure. Under a 
traditional law and economics analysis, rational investors will take into account 
the potential costs and benefits of dual class at the time of the IPO.56 In this 
scenario, investors will pay less for the stock at the time of the IPO if they deem 
dual class harmful. Alternatively, if they view it as beneficial they will pay more. 
In either case, because dual class stock is “priced,” policy prescriptions are 
unneeded. And while companies may change situations over time, in a 
diversified market some will do better than others, meaning shareholders will 
earn a market return. Indeed, if market participants effectively price the potential 
costs associated with dual class at the IPO stage, dual class stock should be 
impervious to empirical analysis. 
This argument assumes that markets are efficient at the IPO stage in pricing 
dual class stock, an assumption that is controversial. An extensive literature 
argues that the IPO market is not efficient in pricing governance terms.57 
Moreover, this argument ignores any externalized effects of dual class stock. For 
 
53 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, DUAL CLASS COMPANIES LIST (2018), 
https://www.cii.org/files/Board%20Accountability/Dual%20Class%20Company%20List%2
02018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGF4-5FKW]. 
54 SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. & EUROPEAN CORP. 
GOVERNANCE INST., REPORT ON THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
15, 26-27 (2007). See generally Morten Bennedsen & Kasper Meisner Nielsen, Incentive and 
Entrenchment Effects in European Ownership, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 2212 (2010). 
55 See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 8 (discussing tradeoff between minority 
protection and controller rights in adopting concentrated ownership structures). 
56 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 17-19 (1991) (claiming that terms in corporate governance “are fully priced 
in transactions among the interested parties”). 
57 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? 
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 86-113 (2001) (questioning 
efficiency of IPO market in pricing governance terms); Fisch, Hamdani & Davidoff Solomon, 
supra note 21, at 42-43 (identifying limitations of IPO market in pricing governance terms). 
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example, the chaos at Viacom over control of the company harmed employees, 
suppliers, and other non-shareholder constituents.58 Even if the IPO market were 
efficient, this harm would go unpriced. 
The uncertain theoretical basis for valuing dual class stock is matched by 
unclear evidence on the effect of dual class on value.59 A number of studies of 
dual class firms in the era prior to Google found that dual class stock was value-
decreasing.60 These studies relied on basic agency theory as articulated by 
Professors Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means concerning the separation of 
ownership and control61 and the theoretical motivation of a controller to take 
advantage of its differential voting and economic position to extract private 
benefits.62 Numerous studies outside the dual class context provide further 
theoretical justification that firm value and stock market returns decrease as the 
divergence between voting and cash flow rights increases.63 Notably, however, 
these studies focused primarily on family-owned and media companies, which 
are very different from the technology companies that have adopted dual class 
structures more recently.64 
 
58 See, e.g., Anthony Noto, Viacom Continues to Cut Costs, Lays Off Employees, N.Y. 
BUS. J. (Feb. 6, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com/newyork/news/2018/02/06/ 
viacom-continues-to-cut-costs-lays-off-employees.html (reporting that Viacom laid off 1% of 
its total staff). 
59 See generally Anand, supra note 47, at 203-07 (summarizing empirical literature on 
effects of dual class structures). 
60 See, e.g., Henry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting 
Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 
33 (1985); Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell & Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market of 
Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983); Tatiana Nenova, The 
Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 
325 (2003); Luigi Zingales, Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public, 62 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 425 (1995). 
61 See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
62 See, e.g., Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An 
International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 540 (2004) (“The use of a company’s money to pay 
for perquisites is the most visible but not the most important way in which corporate resources 
can be used to the sole (or main) advantage of the controlling party.”). 
63 See, e.g., Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, supra note 6, at 1084 (finding that firm value is 
“negatively associated with the wedge between [insiders’ cash-flow rights and voting 
rights]”); Michael L. Lemmon & Karl V. Lins, Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, 
and Firm Value: Evidence from the East Asian Financial Crisis, 53 J. FIN. 1445, 1447 (2003) 
(finding lower stock returns in firm in which managers have “separated their control and cash 
flow ownership”); Karl V. Lins, Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets, 38 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 159, 181 (2003) (finding lower firm values “[w]hen 
managers have control rights that exceed their proportional ownership”). 
64 Google Inc., supra note 37, at 30 (“[S]imilar [dual class] structures are common in the 
media business and has had a profound importance there. The New York Times Company, 
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Another conflicting strand of research has identified potential value-
increasing attributes to the dual class structure.65 This literature attributes value 
to dual class in certain circumstances, including when there is information 
asymmetry between shareholders66 or shareholders with a short term focus.67 
Others have found that dual class allows firms to cement long term relationships 
with other constituencies and to make long-term investments.68 David Berger, a 
prominent litigator at the Silicon Valley law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & 
Rosati, defended the increasing use of dual class stock stating that “it really was 
developed to respond to the changing nature of our corporate republic.”69 Other 
academics have also supported dual class structures. Professor Dorothy Shapiro 
Lund argues that no-vote shares can “lessen agency and transaction costs” by 
reducing inefficiencies.70 Many shareholders do not exercise their voting rights, 
so Lund argues that allowing “rationally apathetic investors” to sell their voting 
rights would distribute voting rights more optimally.71 Professor Bernard 
Sharfman also argues that dual class shares allow private ordering to increase 
value through bargaining.72 
Empirical research has documented that, at least in the early years following 
an IPO, dual class firms may outperform firms with a single class of stock. 
 
the Washington Post Company and Dow Jones, the publisher of The Wall Street Journal, all 
have similar dual class ownership structures.”). 
65 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 713, 714-17 (2003) (identifying theories as to how dual class structures may increase 
firm value). 
66 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 783 (1972). 
67 Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic 
Corporate Behavior, 104 Q.J. ECON. 655, 661-65 (1989); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats 
and Managerial Myopia, 96 J. POL. ECON. 61, 61-64 (1988). 
68 DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 60, at 35 (suggesting that reduced exposure to 
competition may encourage investments in innovation); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 
Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity, with an Application 
to Takeovers, 19 RAND J. ECON. 516, 530-31 (1988) (identifying potential efficiency 
justifications for defensive tactics, including dual class structures); cf. Andrei Shleifer & 
Lawrence H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33, 40-41 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (noting that incumbent 
managers are successful because they build relationships of trust with stakeholders). 
69 David Berger, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Why Dual-Class Stock: A Brief 
Response to Commissioners Jackson and Stein, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
FIN. REG. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/02/22/why-dual-class-stock-
a-brief-response-to-commissioners-jackson-and-stein/#1 [https://perma.cc/ZKY5-43GU]. 
70 Dorothy Shapiro Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 4) (emphasis omitted), https://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3028173 [https://perma.cc/8HMK-7LY8]. 
71 Id. (manuscript at 5-6). 
72 Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private Ordering Defense of a Company’s Right to Use Dual 
Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2018). 
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Professors Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach, and Anete Pajuste, for example, 
find that dual class firms outperform their single class counterparts for seven to 
eight years after an IPO.73 Professors Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst, and Tony Via 
find that insider control at multi-class firms has a positive effect on innovation, 
at least in the early years following an IPO.74 Similarly, Professors Hyunseob 
Kim and Roni Michaely find that firms with multi-class structures outperform 
single class firms for eleven years following the IPO.75 Most recently, an MSCI 
study found that issuers with unequal voting rights outperformed the market over 
a ten year period.76 
These studies are not only conflicting but in many cases suffer from 
econometric limitations. The primary issue with finance studies of dual class 
stock is selection effects—namely that the companies that select into dual class 
structures differ in important ways from companies that adopt single class 
structures.77 More specifically, companies with value decreasing corporate 
governance or those otherwise prone to poor performance may select into dual 
class structures in order to insulate the board and executives from their poor 
performance. If this is the case, dual class stock is merely a symptom of poor 
governance or performance and not itself value reducing. And companies are 
able to implement these structures at the IPO stage due to inefficiencies in the 
IPO process itself. Relatedly, companies with strong governance and value 
creation mechanisms may prefer this structure in order to cement ties with other 
constituencies and truly plan for the long term. In either case, no finance study 
has to date adequately disentangled these effects and addressed this selection 
issue. 
 
73 Martijn Cremers, Beni Lauterbach & Anete Pajuste, The Life-Cycle of Dual Class Firms 
1, 27 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 550, 2018), https:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3062895 [https://perma.cc/PMD9-ZHLL]. 
74 Lindsay Baran, Arno Forst & M. Tony Via, Dual Class Share Structure and Innovation 
4 (Dec. 21, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3183517 [https://perma.cc/A5Q4-ZQB7] (finding that “[d]ual class structures 
enhance firms’ innovative outputs”). 
75 Hyunseob Kim & Roni Michaely, Sticking Around Too Long? Dynamics of the Benefits 
of Dual Class Structures 19 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 
590, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3145209 [https://perma.cc/ 
XHD4-4KBL]. 
76 Dimitris Melas, Putting the Spotlight on Spotify: Why Have Stocks with Unequal Voting 
Rights Outperformed?, MSCI (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.msci.com/www/blog-posts/put 
ting-the-spotlight-on/0898078592 [https://perma.cc/WMF6-A2LQ] (reporting research 
showing that “unequal voting stocks in aggregate outperformed the market over the period 
from November 2007 to August 2017, and that excluding them from market indexes would 
have reduced the indexes’ total returns by approximately 30 basis points per year over our 
sample period”). 
77 See, e.g., Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 31-32 (discussing problem 
of selection effects in study of dual class firms). 
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A second issue is time. Companies with dual class stock may have life spans 
as long as public firms. Dual class stock may create value in the early years when 
the company is implementing its long-term agenda. However, dual class 
companies may suffer in later years as the founders become distracted or future 
generations take control of the company. A recent example is Viacom, where 
the controller, Sumner Redstone, refused to give up control of the company 
despite being incapacitated and unable to speak.78 
In their paper, Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste analyze this issue. The 
authors find that in a sample of dual class firms matched with a single class 
sample from 1980-2015, dual class firms on average have a higher valuation at 
the IPO stage than single class firms, a premium which disappears over time.79 
These findings generally align with another study of the matter by Professors 
Kim and Michaely, who also find that, in the early years, dual class firms have 
higher valuations but in later years are less agile and dynamic.80 
These studies address the time issue, but they too suffer from econometric 
issues. More specifically, in both studies the authors rely on matched pair 
analysis to address selection effects. In a matched pair analysis, a dual class 
company is matched with a similar non-dual class company to compare 
performance.81 This yields a sample of comparable firms that can then be 
compared on an average basis. This is an accepted technique in econometrics,82 
however the quality and scope of the match always creates uncertainty. In the 
case of the Cremers and Kim papers we simply do not know the quality and fit 
of the match, particularly due to the selection issue. In addition, most studies of 
time-based effects focus on firms prior to the Google IPO, out of necessity. The 
Google IPO, however, changed the mix and character of dual class stock. Post-
Google, dual class became more wide-spread in growth companies in the 
technology industry but also in other industries.83 Yet, most of the growth in 
dual class companies has occurred in the last several years, making the long term 
effect of these structures impossible to evaluate empirically.84 For example, the 
 
78 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 587-88 (discussing that ninety-three year old 
Redstone refused to give up control despite “profound physical and mental illness”). 
79 Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 5. 
80 Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 19. Both this study and that of Cremers, Lauterbach 
and Pajuste use matched-pair analysis to attempt to address selection effects. 
81 Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 15-16 (describing matching of dual 
class and single class firms based on IPO year and “several key characteristics”). 
82 See generally Elizabeth A. Stuart, Matching Methods for Causal Inference: A Review 
and a Look Forward, 25 STAT. SCI. 1 (2010) (providing overview of matching methodologies 
in empirical research). 
83 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
84 See, e.g., Rob Kalb & Rob Yates, Institutional S’holder Servs., Inc., Snap, Inc. 
Reportedly to IPO with Unprecedented Non-Voting Shares for Public, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 7, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/ 
02/07/snap-inc-reportedly-to-ipo-with-unprecedented-non-voting-shares-for-public/ 
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Kim and Michaely study finds a turning point in the value of multi-class 
structures eleven years after the IPO,85 but the vast majority of technology 
companies with dual class structures went public less than eleven years ago. 
Even if the econometric issues could be addressed, the use of dual class among 
modern companies and its widespread growth have yet to be fully examined. 
2. The Policy Debate 
The uncertain empirical evidence has fueled an increasingly heated policy 
debate over the use of dual class stock. As previously noted, Commissioner 
Jackson called out dual class stock for perpetuating “corporate royalty.”86 
Similarly, SEC Commissioner Kara Stein stated that these structures are 
“inherently undemocratic, disconnecting the interests of a company’s 
controlling shareholders from its other shareholders.”87 
Commissioner Jackson’s arguments against dual class stock reflect a policy 
debate within stock markets. Shareholder-rights advocates such as CII have led 
the charge against dual class stock, asserting that stock with differential voting 
should be barred and “every share of a public company’s common stock should 
have equal voting rights.”88 The proxy advisory services, such as Institutional 
Shareholder Services (“ISS”), have also denounced dual class stock.89 These 
organizations have been joined by BlackRock, State Street Corporation, and T. 
Rowe Price in calling for the elimination of stock with unequal voting rights.90 
 
[https://perma.cc/464F-V8DV] (documenting fact that twenty Russell 3000 companies with 
dual class structure held their first annual meeting in 2016, as opposed to only ten in 2015). 
85 Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 18. 
86 Jackson, Jr., supra note 7. 
87 Kara M. Stein., Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at Stanford University: 
Mutualism: Reimagining the Role of Shareholders in Modern Corporate Governance (Feb. 
13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein-021318#_ednref45 [https://perma 
.cc/E6Z6-LSNS]. 
88 Dual-Class Stock, supra note 4. 
89 See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., U.S. PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES 32 (2018), 
https://www.issgovernance.com/file/policy/latest/americas/US-Voting-Guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J2X4-R6X7] (reporting that ISS’s policy is generally to vote against 
creation of dual class structures unless, inter alia, “[t]he company discloses a compelling 
rationale for the dual-class capital structure”); Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Bernstein 
Litowitz Berger & Grossmann LLP, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving Institutions 
of Corporate Voting Rights, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 17, 
2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-the-consequences-of-deprivin 
g-institutional-investors-of-corporate-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/AA35-LSRA]. 
90 See Marriage, supra note 2 (stating that State Street “urged” SEC to block dual class 
structures); Elzio Barreto & Sumeet Chatterjee, Blackrock Pitches for Shareholder 
Protections as Asia Bourses Weigh Dual-Class Listings, REUTERS (Sept. 25, 2017, 2:19 AM), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-summit-regulation-blackrock/blackrock-pitches-for-
shareholder-protection-as-asia-bourses-weigh-dual-class-listings-idUKKCN1C10KD 
[https://perma.cc/9BTF-FD7Y]; Nicholas & Marsh, supra note 89 (noting that BlackRock, 
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In 2017, a new front opened in the war on dual class stock—several major 
index providers decided to limit the inclusion of issuers with dual class voting 
structures. The Financial Times Stock Exchange (“FTSE”) Russell decided to 
exclude all firms in which the public shareholders hold less than 5% of the firm’s 
voting power.91 S&P Dow Jones, which administers the S&P 500, among other 
popular indexes, excluded all new dual class firms.92 MSCI decided to retain 
dual class issuers in its major indexes but to create a series of new benchmarks 
that contain voting rights in their eligibility criteria.93 The index providers made 
this change at the behest of some index funds who did not feel that the dual class 
governance structure was appropriate.94 At the time, in light of stock exchange 
inaction, some commentators viewed the change as a back-door action.95 
Notably, not all passive investors supported this decision. BlackRock, for 
example, although publicly opposed to the dual class structure, expressed 
concern that excluding dual class companies from the index would deprive its 
index-based clients of “opportunities for returns.”96 
The movement against dual class in the United States has been rejected by 
international markets, which are seeing a trend towards allowing greater use of 
dual class stock. In response to Alibaba’s decision to list in the United States in 
 
State Street, and T. Rowe Price helped launch stewardship code that discourages dual class 
shares). 
91 FTSE RUSSELL, FTSE RUSSELL VOTING RIGHTS CONSULTATION – NEXT STEPS 2 (2017), 
https://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/FTSE_Russell_Voting_Rights_Consultation_Ne
xt_Steps.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WGP-HFFZ]. 
92 Press Release, S&P Dow Jones Indices, S&P Dow Jones Indices Announces Decision 
on Multi-Class Shares and Voting Rules (July 31, 2017), https://www.spice-
indices.com/idpfiles/spice-assets/resources/public/documents/561162_spdjimulti-
classsharesandvotingrulesannouncement7.31.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ATA-JJZF]. 
93 See Rachel Evans, MSCI Rejects Calls to Ban Dual-Class Stocks from Its Indexes, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 30, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-
30/msci-rejects-calls-to-ban-dual-class-stocks-from-its-indexes. 
94 See Letter from Kenneth A. Bertsch, Exec. Dir., Council of Institutional Inv’rs, to 
Members of the MSCI Equity Index Comm. (Aug. 3, 2017), https://www.cii.org/files/issues_ 
and_advocacy/correspondence/8-3-17%20CII%20response%20to%20MSCI%20Consutat 
ion.pdf [https://perma.cc/YX2C-D3RT] (“CII’s membership includes strong supporters of 
passive index strategies, and we believe that major index providers have a critical role to play 
in preventing non-voting and multi-class equity structures from gaining unstoppable 
momentum.”). 
95 See Matt Levine, Listing Standards and Dividend Shares, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2017, 
9:25 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2017-04-13/listing-standards-and-
dividend-shares (stating that actions of indexes put them in “weird role” and transgressed 
“long tradition of corporate governance standards being imposed by stock exchanges as 
‘listing standards’”). 
96 Ning Chiu, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes Exclusion from Indexes, 
DAVIS POLK BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.briefinggovernance.com/ 
2017/10/blackrock-wants-equal-voting-rights-but-opposes-exclusion-from-indexes/ 
[https://perma.cc/VK3S-W7HC]. 
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order to use a form of dual class stock, the Singapore and Hong Kong exchanges 
amended their rules to eliminate their prohibitions on dual class stock.97 In 
Europe there has been a strong move towards tenure voting, also known as 
loyalty shares.98 Loyalty shares confer greater voting rights on shareholders who 
hold their stock for a specified period of time and are frequently defended on the 
basis that, by increasing the voting power of long-term shareholders, they 
facilitate managing the corporation with a long-term perspective.99 
Some commentators have argued that loyalty shares offer an intermediate 
approach to the policy debate over dual class for two key reasons.100 First, 
because loyalty shares confer higher voting rights on any shareholder who meets 
the required holding period, they do not privilege the founder over public 
shareholders.101 Second, the structure of loyalty shares makes founder control 
increasingly contestable, as the founder’s economic stake decreases relative to 
the holdings of outside investors.102 As a result, public shareholders are likely to 
have greater power in situations in which the agency costs associated with 
founder or managerial entrenchment are likely to be greatest. 
Recent empirical work by Professors Paul Edelman, Wei Jiang, and Randall 
Thomas supports this proposition.103 Edelman, Jiang, and Thomas model the 
relative voting power of founders/managers and institutional investors under 
various assumptions, and then, using these assumptions, run a series of 
simulations seeking to evaluate the extent to which control is contestable.104 
 
97 Hong Kong and Singapore Succumb to the Lure of Dual-Class Shares, ECONOMIST 
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/01/hong-kong-
and-singapore-succumb-to-the-lure-of-dual-class-shares. 
98 France, which changed its law in 2014, and Belgium, which is currently considering a 
draft law, provide double voting rights for shareholders who have held shares for at least two 
years. Changes to French Takeover Rules, ALLEN & OVERY (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.allen 
overy.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Changes-to-French-takeover-rules.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/2FF8-DLRT]; Matthieu Duplat, Thomas Flament & Aurélie Cautaerts, Loyalty Shares for 
Belgian Listed Companies: Fundamental Change on the Way, JONES DAY (June 2018), 
https://www.jonesday.com/Loyalty-Shares-for-Belgian-Listed-Companies-Fundamental-
Change-on-the-Way-06-25-2018/. 
99 See Paul Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate 
Managers Lifetime Tenure? 48-49 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
384, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3107225 [https://perma.cc/ 
R8MT-MT87] (describing and empirically analyzing effect of tenure voting on management’s 
ability to retain control). 
100 See, e.g., David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure 
Voting and the U.S. Public Company, 72 BUS. LAW. 295, 297 (2017) (describing tenure voting 
as “an alternate capital structure that may curb perceived short-termism”). 
101 See id. (“By design, tenure voting rewards all shareholders who hold their shares for an 
extended period.”). 
102 See id. at 310. 
103 Edelman, Jiang & Thomas, supra note 99, at 2. 
104 Id. 
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They show that, although loyalty shares effectively preserve founder control 
when the founder retains a 20-30% economic stake, when the founder’s 
ownership declines to as little as 3%, outside investors obtain a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge founder control.105 
In sum, the shifting policy debate over dual class mimics the conflicting 
empirical evidence: no definitive and known truth has yet emerged as to whether 
and when dual class stock is desirable.106 
II. THE ROLE OF SUNSETS 
Perhaps in response to the continuing debate over the efficacy of dual class 
structures, critics have shifted to a more nuanced approach. Rather than 
advocating an outright ban of dual class structures, these commentators 
increasingly argue that if a company adopts a dual class structure, that structure 
should be subject to a sunset provision. A sunset provision provides that, upon 
some pre-specified date or event, the high vote stock converts to low vote stock, 
effectively extinguishing the dual class structure. 
Proponents of sunsets argue that they blunt the impact of the undemocratic 
nature of dual class.107 Commissioner Jackson, for example, has focused his 
opposition to dual class stock on the “perpetual dual-class” aspect.108 In a 
landmark speech, he criticized perpetual dual class stock on the grounds that it 
“raises the prospect that control over our public companies, and ultimately of 
Main Street’s retirement savings, will be forever held by a small, elite group of 
corporate insiders—who will pass that power down to their heirs.”109 He called 
for exchanges to require, as a condition of listing, issuers with dual class to give 
their shareholders the opportunity to eliminate the dual class structure at some 
point in the future.110 Commissioner Jackson supported his position with 
empirical evidence compiled by the SEC showing value-decreasing effects of 
companies with perpetual dual class stock, as opposed to companies with dual 
class that adopted sunset provisions.111 Commissioner Jackson also cited long-
held American beliefs based on President Thomas Jefferson’s work against 
 
105 Id. at 45-48. 
106 See, e.g., Anand, supra note 47, at 205 (“[F]or virtually every study noting a problem 
with DCS firms, there is a study either finding a benefit or a neutral effect of DCS on firm 
value.”). 
107 This Article questions the proposition that an inappropriate governance structure can 
somehow be made acceptable if it is limited in duration, although it recognizes that this 
principle has been accepted in other contexts. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 
341-43 (2003) (observing that, although race-based admissions procedures may violate 
Fourteenth Amendment, they may be permissible as long as they are limited in duration). 
108 Jackson, Jr., supra note 7. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
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“pseudo-aristocracy” and the idea that “[i]n America, we don’t inherit power, 
and we don’t hold power forever.”112 
Sunset provisions appear to be a middle ground argument designed to blunt 
the impact of dual class stock. However, these arguments have focused on 
sunsetting in general, and proponents of sunsets have focused primarily on time-
based sunsets. We analyze both those positions in further detail. 
A. Time-Based Sunset Provisions 
The type of sunset that has received the most widespread support is the time-
based sunset.113 A time-based sunset requires that the dual class stock expire at 
a pre-specified date, typically one that is established in the charter of the 
company at the time of the IPO.114 The concept behind a time-based sunset is 
that it provides a period of time for the founder to realize his idiosyncratic vision. 
When the pre-set date arrives, share capital of the company converts to a single 
class.115 
1. The Rationale for Time-Based Sunsets 
Time-based sunsets are based on the proposition that, although a dual class 
structure may initially enhance firm value, the utility of the structure declines 
over time following the IPO. Several academic studies provide evidence of this 
decline. For example, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel show that 
“as time passes, the potential costs of a dual-class structure tend to increase while 
the potential benefits tend to erode.”116 Cremers, Lauterbach, and Pajuste find 
similar trends, demonstrating that, although dual class firms are generally valued 
more highly at the time of the IPO, that valuation premium is eroded in about 
six to nine years post IPO.117 They further find that, over that time period, the 
difference between voting power and equity stakes of the controlling 
shareholders grows significantly.118 Kim and Michaely find that, as dual class 
 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., CFA INST., DUAL CLASS SHARES AND THE NEED FOR SAFEGUARDS 4 (2018), 
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/survey/dual-class-shares-survey-report.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/D27M-JXEF] (reporting that, in survey of CFA members in Asia Pacific, 
ninety-four percent supported time-based sunset provisions as appropriate safeguard for 
companies with dual class structures); Anand, supra note 47, at 234-37 (describing case for 
fixed-time sunsets). 
114 See, e.g., Press Release, Council for Institutional Inv’rs, Investors Petition NYSE, 
Nasdaq to Curb Listings of IPO Dual-Class Share Companies (Oct. 24, 2018), 
https://www.cii.org/files/issues_and_advocacy/correspondence/FINAL%20Dual%20Class%
20Petition%20Press%20Release%20Oct%2024,%202018.pdf [https://perma.cc/23QX-
GJ6H] (defining time-based sunsets). 
115 Id. 
116 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 590. 
117 Cremers, Lauterbach & Pajuste, supra note 73, at 5-6. 
118 Id. at 10. 
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companies mature, their operating margins and labor productivity fall more and 
the pace of innovation declines faster than single class companies.119 
CII, which has long opposed dual class structures altogether, has taken the 
position that, to the extent dual class structures are permitted, all dual class 
companies should contain a mandatory time-based sunset provision. On October 
24, 2018, CII submitted letters to NASDAQ and the NYSE asking them to 
amend their listing standards to require newly listed companies with dual class 
structures to include mandatory sunset provisions.120 According to CII, such a 
provision should have the effect of converting the issuer’s high vote stock to 
one-share, one-vote “no more than seven years after IPO date.”121 Similarly, the 
Canadian Coalition for Good Governance (“CCGG”) has not advocated a 
specific time limit but has stated that the dual class structure “should collapse at 
an appropriate time . . . if practicable, as set out in the DCS company’s 
articles.”122 
Issuers have responded to the demand for time-based sunsetting. According 
to a study by Andrew Winden, of a sample of 139 companies with dual class 
stock, only two companies had time-based sunset provisions prior to 2010, but 
currently 18% have time-based sunsets.123 For companies that went public in 
2010 or after, 32% of dual class companies have a time-based sunset.124 
2. The Arbitrary Nature of Time-Based Sunsets 
One challenge with sunsets is identifying the appropriate length of time before 
the sunset is triggered. Among existing public companies with time-based 
sunsets, the time period varies substantially from as short as three years, to as 
long as twenty years in the case of the 2012 Workday IPO.125 Groupon has a five 
year sunset, Yelp has a seven year sunset, and Fitbit has a twelve year sunset.126 
EVO Payments filed to go public with a three year sunset.127 This issue persists 
into 2019, with Zoom adopting a 15-year sunset and Pinterest adopting a seven-
year sunset that is triggered only when a holder’s ownership goes below 50% of 
 
119 Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 2. 
120 Letter from Ash Williams, supra note 20, at 1. 
121 Id. The CII proposal would allow shareholders to vote to retain the dual class structure 
at the end of the sunset period, a proposition that is explored further below. 
122 CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, DUAL CLASS SHARE POLICY 10 (2013), 
https://admin.yourwebdepartment.com/site/ccgg/assets/pdf/Dual_Class_Share_Policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HW2F-82SF]. The CCGG principles authorize the holders of the low vote 
shares to extend the dual class structure, but provide that any such extension “should remain 
in effect for five years or such shorter period of time as is approved at the shareholder 
meeting.” Id. 
123 Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51. 
124 Id. 
125 Workday, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 31 (Aug. 30, 2012). 
126 Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51. 
127 EVO Payments, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 17 (Apr. 25, 2018). 
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his IPO holdings.128 Lyft has no time-based sunset.129 According to Winden, the 
most common period for a time-based sunset is seven or ten years.130 In CII’s 
data of twenty-four companies that have gone public with time-based sunset 
provisions, there is little consistency in the sunset period—10.5% of sunsets 
were five years; 31.6% were seven years; 36.8% were ten years; and 21.1% were 
longer than ten years.131 
There is nothing inherently problematic about issuer-specific variation in the 
sunset length. Theoretically, each firm should be picking the time period best 
suited to its founder. But there is no evidence that this is the case. Rather, the 
sunset lengths chosen by individual firms do not appear to be tied to 
characteristics of the firms and their founders. For example, Workday went 
public in 2012 with a twenty-year sunset provision.132 At the time of its IPO, its 
founders were seventy-one and forty-six years old, meaning that they will be 
ninety-one and sixty-six when the sunset is triggered.133 
More problematic than the variation is the fact that the length of the sunset 
period appears to be arbitrary and does not seem to correlate with any theory 
about the length of time necessary for a founder to implement his or her vision. 
If a founder’s strategic vision is flawed or the founder is otherwise inclined to 
exploit private benefits, the insulation conferred by even a relatively short sunset 
may be unwarranted. Commentators have noted, for example, that many dual 
class issuers struggle financially even in the first few years after their IPO, 
suggesting that, at least for these companies, a five or seven year sunset is much 
too long.134 On the other hand, the benefits from the founder’s innovative vision 
need not be limited to the initial years following the IPO. For example, the 
founders of Facebook and Google are still at the helm of their companies and 
appear to be creating value, despite being public for six and fourteen years 
respectively.135  
 
128 See Pinterest, Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 182 (Apr. 8, 
2019); Zoom Video Communications, Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), 
at 127 (Apr. 16, 2019). 
129 See Lyft, Inc., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 204 (Mar. 27, 2019). 
130 Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51. 
131 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 1, at 1. 
132 Workday, Inc., supra note 125, at 31. 
133 Id. 
134 See, e.g., Sam McBride, Snapchat Shows the Problems with “Visionary” Founders and 
Dual Class Share Structures, NEW CONSTRUCTS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.new 
constructs.com/snapchat-shows-the-problems-with-visionary-founders-and-dual-class-
share-structures/ [https://perma.cc/8WLF-UF8M] (reporting on Snap’s poor financial 
performance post-IPO and observing that Domo, Dropbox, and Green Sky have also 
performed poorly). 
135 Facebook, Inc., Prospectus, at 1 (May 17, 2012) (showing Facebook went public on 
May 18, 2012); Google, Inc., Final Prospectus, at 1 (Aug. 18, 2004) (showing Google went 
public on August 18, 2004). 
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For similar reasons, a one-size-fits-all approach to sunsets—like those 
proposed by CII or adopted by index providers—does not make sense. The 
timeframe necessary for realizing a company’s goals is likely to vary depending 
on the company, based on factors like the company’s maturity at the IPO stage, 
the duration of its business model, and the time required to develop its products 
or services and bring them to market.136 
It is also uncertain whether any time-based sunset at the IPO stage can 
successfully align founder vision with control. People change, as do firms. An 
example of such a change is Sumner Redstone, who is ninety-five and in 
declining health, but controls CBS through his ownership of National 
Amusements.137 It may very well be that a founder’s vision is aligned with the 
firm’s at the IPO level, but that, for a variety of reasons, including personal ones, 
this diverges at some point. Predicting the point of this divergence purely by 
passage of time is an impossible task. 
Currently, the market has limited experience with the effect on an issuer when 
a sunset provision is triggered. CII records only three companies in which the 
dual class structure was terminated due to the effectiveness of a time-based 
sunset provision: Groupon, MaxLinear, and Texas Roadhouse.138 All three 
sunsets were triggered fairly recently.139 We therefore have little insight into 
how these provisions will function in reality. Put differently, we lack sufficient 
experience to determine whether the sunsets eliminate valuable protection for a 
founder to implement his or her vision. Moreover, although some analysts have 
observed that the elimination of the dual class structure may facilitate an issuer’s 
 
136 See, e.g., Vinay Prasad & Sham Mailankody, Research and Development Spending to 
Bring a Single Cancer Drug to Market and Revenues After Approval, 177 JAMA INTERNAL 
MED. 1569, 1573 (2017) (finding that issuers in its study took average of six to fifteen years 
to bring cancer drug to market). 
137 Jessica Toonkel & Liana B. Baker, CBS Weighs Share Options for Post-Redstone Era, 
REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2016, 5:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cbs-votingshares-
exclusive/exclusive-cbs-weighs-share-options-for-post-redstone-era-sources-
idUSKCN0XP31J [https://perma.cc/8CBY-8QZ8] (“CBS and Viacom both have dual-class 
share structures with 80 percent of their voting shares owned by National Amusements . . . .”). 
Because of these developments, National Amusements is effectively controlled by Sumner’s 
daughter, Shari Redstone. 
138 COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, TIME-BASED SUNSET APPROACHES TO DUAL-CLASS 
STOCK (2018), https://www.cii.org/files/Board%20Accountability/7-13-18%20Time-based% 
20Sunsets.pdf [https://perma.cc/6CN5-UP4Y]. Yelp’s dual class structure also converted in 
2016 due to a decline in the percentage of stock held by the founders. See Jason Aycock, Yelp 
Caught in M&A Chatter, Up 2.6%; Ends Dual-Class Shares, SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 23, 2016, 
3:11 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/news/3210618-yelp-caught-m-chatter-2_6-percent-ends-
dual-class-shares [https://perma.cc/Y29R-8XQ7] (“The conversion was automatic as 
outstanding class B stock represented [less] than 10% of outstanding shares.”). 
139 See COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INV’RS, supra note 138 (stating that three sunsets were 
converted between 2009 and 2018). 
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acquisition, a result that could potentially increase firm value, buyouts of 
companies in this limited sample have failed to materialize.140 
3. The Moral Hazard Problem 
Not only is it unclear that a time-based sunset can accurately predict what 
duration of dual class is likely to maximize firm value, sunsets also create 
problematic incentive structures. Time-based sunsets identify a specific date at 
which a founder will lose control. This date, which Professor Jack Coffee 
describes as a “sharp cliff,” increases the incentive for founders to use control, 
while they have it, to maximize their personal economic position, even if their 
actions sacrifice value for the minority shareholders.141 These incentives 
increase as the expiration date for the dual class structure draws closer. For 
example, the knowledge that the founder’s control is drawing to an end can cause 
the founder to engage in short-termist behavior such as excessive risk-taking or 
conservatism, self-dealing, or opportunistic behavior with other ventures. 
Founders may seek to divert valuable opportunities to other firms, or to reduce 
the degree to which they invest energy and innovative ideas in an issuer at which 
they will soon lose control. A particular risk is that founders will enter into 
transactions that enable them to sell their control block at a premium or that 
provide them with other private benefits.142 
 
140 See, e.g., Bryan Finnigan, End Of Yelp’s Dual-Class Share Structure Could Provide 
Catalyst for Takeout, BENZINGA (Sept. 26, 2016, 11:14 AM), https://www.benzinga.com/ 
analyst-ratings/analyst-color/16/09/8495111/end-of-yelps-dual-class-share-structure-could-
provide-ca [https://perma.cc/74AZ-K6YB] (observing that Yelp’s elimination of dual class 
makes it more attractive acquisition target); Will Healy, Yelp Inc Is a Buyout Target 
Masquerading As a Growth Company, INVESTORPLACE (Feb. 8, 2018, 12:15 PM), 
https://investorplace.com/2018/02/yelp-inc-yelp-stock-buyout-target-growth/ 
[https://perma.cc/S5PM-288E] (observing that buyout of Yelp “remains far from certain”). 
141 Coffee, Jr., supra note 3. 
142 Although corporate law allows a controlling stockholder to obtain a control premium 
upon the sale of the control block, it is unclear what legal standard courts would apply in 
evaluating such a transaction. One legal response is to require dual class issuers to provide 
takeover protective provisons (“coatails”) that ensure that minority shareholders can 
participate in a change of control transaction on the same terms as the holders of high vote 
stock. See TORONTO STOCK EXCHANGE, TSX COMPANY MANUAL § 624(l), http://tmx.comp 
linet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2072&element_id=299 [https://perma.cc/S49 
X-TERX] (last visited Apr. 10, 2019) (describing coatails and requiring listed dual class 
issuers to include coatails, terms of which are pre-approved by TSX). A controlling 
stockholder may have other options such as entering into a position in which he or she has 
other options including an acquisition in which the founder obtains a management position in 
the acquiring company. For example, MuleSoft founder Greg Schott retained control of 
MuleSoft, which was to be operated as a separate division upon MuleSoft’s acquisition by 
Salesforce. See Phil Wainewright, How MuleSoft Will Change the Way Salesforce Connects 
Its Clouds, DIGINOMICA (June 22, 2018), https://diginomica.com/2018/06/22/how-mulesoft-
will-change-the-way-salesforce-connects-its-clouds/ [https://perma.cc/4MEK-T7B7] 
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Conversely, the controller may attempt to prolong the time of the dual class 
stock. Companies without sunset provisions have already engaged in similar 
transactions. For example, Google and Zillow have issued Class C non-voting 
shares that allow the controller to further dilute its interests without giving up 
control.143 Facebook also attempted this maneuver but withdrew the proposal in 
light of litigation.144 
4. Shareholder Retention Voting 
Supporters of mandatory sunset provisions have attempted to respond to the 
argument that the automatic trigger of a time-based sunset provision may not 
align with the time period appropriate for the founder to engage in value-creating 
behavior by coupling a time-based sunset with an optional shareholder retention 
vote. Such a vote would enable existing shareholders, voting on a one-share/one-
vote basis, to retain or extend the dual class structure prior to its expiration.145 
For example, the CII proposal would allow shareholders of dual class issuers to 
vote on a one-share/one-vote basis to extend the dual class structure.146 
Similarly, the dual class principles issued by the CCGG allow the minority 
shareholders to vote to extend the dual class structure for a maximum of five 
years beyond its termination date.147 
The retention vote would have the effect of providing minority shareholders 
with an option. If, in their view, the founder’s control is continuing to enhance 
firm value, the minority shareholders can vote to retain it. If, however, the 
insulation has outlived its usefulness or generates excessive agency costs, the 
shareholders can vote against retention, at which point the shares will convert 
automatically to a single class structure. 
Commentators have devoted little attention to analyzing the operation of such 
a shareholder vote, however. Any expectation that a vote of existing minority 
shareholders will function efficiently to identify situations in which there is 
value to retaining a dual class structure is highly problematic. First, existing 
minority shareholders will invariably benefit from eliminating dual class, as the 
effect of the sunset will be to transfer control from the founders to the public 
 
(“MuleSoft will remain an independent business unit within Salesforce under the leadership 
of its existing CEO Greg Schott . . . .”). 
143 Jhonsa, supra note 24; Norris, supra note 24. 
144 See Alex Heath, A Power Struggle Between Facebook and Investors Just Ended with 
Facebook Dropping Plans to Issue Non-Voting Shares, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 22, 2017, 2:37 
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-settled-lawsuit-non-voting-shares-
zuckerberg-testify-2017-9. 
145 See Letter from Ash Williams, supra note 20, at 1 (calling for mandatory sunset 
provisions “subject to extension by additional terms of no more than seven years each, by 
vote of a majority of outstanding shares of each share class, voting separately, on a one-share, 
one-vote basis”). 
146 Dual-Class Stock, supra note 4. 
147 CANADIAN COAL. FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE, supra note 122, at 10. 
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shareholders. As the courts have recognized in other contexts, the value of this 
control is substantial.148 Accordingly, public shareholders will be conflicted in 
evaluating the voting decision as they will have to weigh the value of obtaining 
control against the potential value of extending the dual class structure. 
Second, the need of dual class is based on the proposition that market forces 
are not sufficient to enable public shareholders to evaluate the founder’s vision 
and the firm’s long-term business plan adequately and will, as a result, 
imprudently sacrifice long-term firm value. Therefore, defenders of dual class 
argue that it is necessary to insulate the founder from short-termist market 
pressure.149 To the extent that market forces are not sufficient to enable public 
shareholders to evaluate and price sunset provisions accurately at the IPO stage, 
it is unclear why their ability to do so midstream will be superior. As a result, 
the theory that public shareholders can properly evaluate whether to retain dual 
class at the time of the retention vote seems inconsistent with the basic premise 
of the dual class structure. 
One possible response is that, at the time of the retention vote, shareholders 
have better information with which to evaluate the value of dual class. When 
voting on whether to retain the dual class structure, public shareholders have the 
benefit of knowing how the firm has performed subsequent to the IPO, and they 
have the enhanced transparency of that performance afforded by the public 
reporting process. Although this observation is fair, it does not meaningfully 
distinguish the retention vote from the IPO stage or the role of market discipline 
during the initial pre-sunset period. The rationale for dual class in either case is 
that shareholders are limited in their ability to evaluate and appreciate the 
founder’s long-term vision going forward and that, on net, insulation from 
market discipline will promote innovation and increase firm value. Many recent 
dual class IPOs involved issuers of substantial size that relied on the private 
capital markets to operate for a number of years. If dual class structures are 
appropriate, it is because investors cannot reliably evaluate and protect the future 
innovative behavior of those issuers. Similar information asymmetries are likely 
to limit public shareholders’ ability to evaluate an issuer’s potential for further 
innovation in the context of a sunset retention vote. 
Similarly, although the shareholder retention vote can also be understood as 
providing a form of insurance against a founder implementing the dual class 
stock in a value destructive manner, this Article rejects that justification as a 
basis for requiring a time-based sunset. The insurance argument highlights the 
substantial potential costs in terms of a misapplication of the sunset period and 
 
148 See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 47 (Del. 1994) 
(“The existence of a control block of stock in the hands of a single shareholder or a group 
with loyalty to each other does have real consequences to the financial value of ‘minority’ 
stock.” (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10,866, 1989 WL 79880, at *23 
(Del. Ch. July 14, 1989))); In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 11343, 2016 WL 
5874974, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016) (“Financial markets in widely traded corporate stock 
accord a premium to a block of stock that can assure corporate control.”). 
149 See, e.g., Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 8, at 580-81. 
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the potential for founder misconduct prior thereto. While quantifying these costs 
is impossible, they could easily outweigh the benefits of this insurance. In short, 
the insurance claim proves too much—if insurance is truly warranted, it is 
because of the potential costs of the dual class structure. 
B. Alternative Sunset Provisions 
As explained in the preceding Section, the mere passage of time is a poor 
proxy for evaluating whether the utility of a dual class structure has evaporated. 
To the extent that sunsets are an appropriate response to a decline in the value 
of dual class structures, they should focus more precisely on objective events 
that are more likely to result in the founder losing track of his or her mission or 
being overly incentivized to favor his or her own interests. This Article terms 
such provisions “event-based sunsets.” 
This Section identifies several events in this category such as dilution of the 
founder’s interest, the founder’s death or departure from the issuer, and the 
transfer of voting rights to third parties such as heirs. Issuers have adopted event-
based sunsets in varying degrees,150 but they have received far less investor 
attention than time-based sunsets. This Article concludes that, although the 
market has not focused carefully on structuring event-based sunsets 
appropriately, they offer a more promising approach. As of yet, however, the 
costs and benefits of event-based sunsets are untested, and it is equally unclear 
whether they can be designed in a way to overcome the limitations of time-based 
sunsets discussed above. As a result, while this Article does not advocate the 
imposition of mandatory event-based sunsets, it encourages investors and 
commentators to develop event-based sunset provisions through private 
ordering. 
1. Dilution of the Founder’s Interest 
Bebchuk and Kastiel argued that part of the problem with dual class is an 
increasing gap between the founder’s voting power and his or her economic 
interest—they term this gap the “wedge.”151 They find that an increase in the 
size of the wedge is correlated with a decrease in firm value, and they reason 
that as the economic stake of the founder is reduced while voting control remains 
the same, the founder is incentivized to reap private benefits from the firm.152 
This incentive problem can manifest through wealth transfers from the firm to 
the individual or favored interests, or through the founder’s decision to push the 
firm in directions that satisfy his or her non-economic idiosyncratic visions. An 
increased wedge can also reduce the founder’s engagement in operations. 
 
150 See Winden, supra note 17, at 950-51 (presenting data on issuer use of various forms 
of event-based sunsets). 
151 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 603. 
152 Id. 
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These and other incentive problems theoretically justify sunsets keyed to 
dilution, and such sunsets are relatively common. According to Winden there 
are forty-eight companies in his sample with dilution-based sunsets.153 The level 
of dilution required to trigger the sunset ranges from 5% to 25% with 54% of 
companies having a 10% dilution trigger.154 Again, this threshold seems 
arbitrary, and there is evidence of issuers gravitating to a one-size-fits-all 
approach. In contrast to time-based sunsets, however, the rationale of the 
dilution sunset is to ensure that the founder retains a meaningful economic 
interest in the issuer, and there is a plausible argument that once the founder’s 
interest drops below 10%, his or her economic interest is no longer sufficiently 
aligned with the interests of the issuer. Moreover, to the extent that the founder 
wants to avoid triggering the sunset, the solution is to retain a sufficient stake in 
the firm which will benefit all shareholders by reducing the size of the wedge 
and maintaining the alignment of interest between the founder and the firm. 
As of the time this Article was written, the dual class structure of at least one 
issuer, Yelp, has been terminated due to the triggering of a dilution-based 
sunset.155 Yelp went public in 2012 with a dual class structure containing a 
provision that it would be automatically converted into a single share structure 
once the founders’ economic stake dropped below 10%.156 This occurred on 
September 23, 2016 and in the wake of this declassification, Yelp stock rose 
2.6%.157 The conversion would have occurred much later if Yelp had adopted a 
standard time-based sunset. 
This Article does not claim that dilution-based sunsets address all the 
limitations of time-based sunsets, and further refinement of their operation is 
likely necessary to make them sufficiently responsive to the concern described 
above. In particular, because of the founder’s higher voting rights, the threshold 
for triggering the sunset under dilution-based sunsets as currently structured may 
be too low. At the time of its IPO, Zynga’s dual class stock, for example, gave 
its founder, Mark Pincus, seventy votes per share, meaning that Pincus could 
retain control with an economic interest of less than 3% of the company.158 
Universal Health Services’ Class C common stock gives founder Alan Miller 
 
153 Winden, supra note 17, at 872.   
154 Id. at 872-73. The dilution may also be based upon a sale of a specific percentage of 
the founders’ stock, but the same principles apply. 
155 Aycock, supra note 138. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. On that day the S&P 500 fell by 12 points. Harvey S. Katz, William G. Ferguson & 
Adam Rosner, Stock Market Today: September 23, 2016, VALUE LINE (Sept. 23, 2016), 
http://www.valueline.com/Markets/Daily_Updates/Stock_Market_Today__September_23,_
2016.aspx#.XEYzefx7lmA [https://perma.cc/J22L-CGJD]. 
158 See Austen Hufford, Zynga Moves to Single-Class Share Structure, WALL STREET J. 
(May 2, 2018, 4:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/zynga-moves-to-single-class-share-
structure-1525293576. 
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one hundred votes per share.159 Concededly, it is likely impossible to measure 
the right level of dilution or the effect of this divergence of interest in dual class 
stocks.160 
Theoretically, however, dilution-based sunsets offer a response better tailored 
to the concern that, as the founder’s economic interest is reduced, his or her 
incentives become misaligned sufficiently to create a risk of rent-seeking or 
other value-destroying actions. Further, dilution-based sunsets do not create the 
same perverse incentives as time-based sunsets because the founder can avoid 
the trigger by retaining a sufficiently large economic stake. 
2. Transfer of the Founder’s Interest 
Dual class stock sometimes allows the holders of high vote shares to transfer 
the higher voting rights together with a transfer of the shares by sale, gift, or 
inheritance. The most infamous example is Facebook which permits Mark 
Zuckerberg to transfer his high vote stock to his heirs.161 Snap also allows for 
transfers to heirs.162 Provisions that permit founders to transfer high vote stock 
to their heirs would appear to conflict directly with the justification for dual class 
of protecting the founder’s ability to achieve his or her idiosyncratic vision. 
Although an argument could be made that the founder’s successors will continue 
to pursue the founder’s vision, there is little reason to expect that the founder’s 
heirs have any advantage in doing so. Indeed, asset destruction through 
intergenerational transfer is well-documented.163 Allowing a founder to retain 
high voting rights, even upon the transfer of the stock, instead enables the 
founder’s heirs to convert a control right that is designed to maximize firm value 
into a private benefit. 
 
159 Universal Health Servs., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 23-24 (Feb. 28, 2017). 
160 Pinterest, at the time of its IPO, had three founders with high vote (20-1) stock. Its 
sunset provision is triggered if, after a seven-year period from the IPO, a founder sells more 
than 50% of his interest. We question the logic of combining a dilution sunset with a time-
based sunset. Moreover, Bebchuk and Kastiel calculate that two of the founders would still 
control “50% of the company’s voting power with approximately 4.76% of the company’s 
outstanding equity capital.” Lucian Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Pinterest’s Dual-
Class Structure, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE &  FIN. REG. (Apr. 10, 2019), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/04/10/the-perils-of-pinterests-dual-class-structure/ 
[https://perma.cc/GQ69-MWK3]. 
161 Facebook, Inc., supra note 135. The package of charter amendments that proposed the 
issuance of class C shares would have eliminated Mr. Zuckerberg’s ability to transfer his 
shares to his heirs, but that package was never adopted. See Facebook, Inc., Proxy Statement 
56 (June 2, 2016). 
162 Snap Inc., Bylaws of Snap Inc., at 22 (amended June 30, 2013). 
163 See, e.g., George Stalk & Henry Foley, Avoid the Traps That Can Destroy Family 
Businesses, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 25, 25 (describing “the propensity of family-
owned enterprises to fail by the time the founder’s grandchildren have taken charge”). 
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As a result, sunset provisions that convert high vote stock to one-share/one-
vote when the founder bequeaths or gifts that stock appear to be common sense. 
The observation that the founder may transfer high vote stock to third parties 
who do not warrant the insulation of the dual class structure is not limited to 
situations such as inheritance, however. Investors might have similar concerns 
when the holder of high vote stock sells in a market transaction. Notably, dual 
class stock differs from tenure voting in that many dual class structures do not 
automatically convert the high vote stock when it is sold or transferred, even 
though the transfer presumably removes control from the founder whose vision 
the structure was designed to protect and vests that power in someone else. 
Transfers of high vote stock have broader potential to erode value from the 
firm and the public shareholders. For example, as noted above, Delaware law 
currently allows controlling shareholders to sell their interest for a premium.164 
The ability of a controlling shareholder to do so could, in the case of dual class, 
lead to a wealth transfer from the public shareholders to the controller. Such a 
wealth-transfer is particularly problematic in situations in which the sale is 
designed to avoid the effects of a mandatory conversion. A number of dual class 
issuers have responded to this problem by including equal treatment provisions 
in their charters.165 These provisions prevent high vote shareholders from selling 
their stock at a premium over the price that is available to low vote 
shareholders.166 In In re Delphi Financial Group Shareholder Litigation,167 
Delphi had a charter providing that both its high and low voting stock would 
receive the same consideration in any merger, and founder Robert Rosenkranz 
attempted to use his high vote shares to amend the charter and remove that 
provision. The court concluded that Rosenkrantz’s effort to do so was 
coercive.168 
3. Death, Incapacitation, or Departure of the Founder 
The death, incapacitation, or departure of the founder raises similar issues to 
those posed by transfers. The effect may be compounded however by the fact 
that when a founder dies or is incapacitated but retains voting control, the 
company can be left without leadership or direction. 
As previously mentioned, a paradigmatic example is Sumner Redstone and 
the two companies he controls: CBS and Viacom. Redstone is now ninety-five 
 
164 See Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 753 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Under 
Delaware law, a controller remains free to sell its stock for a premium not shared with the 
other stockholders except in very narrow circumstances.”). 
165 See Kirby Smith, The Agency Costs of Equal Treatment Clauses, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 
543, 561 (2017). 
166 Even without such a charter provision, a controller’s premium can be reviewed and 
benchmarked against the market of similar sales. Id. at 562. 
167 No. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 729232 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012). 
168 Id. at *17. 
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and reportedly is unable to speak coherently or move about.169 His incapacitation 
has led to litigious corporate governance battles at both Viacom and CBS 
between Mr. Redstone’s daughter, Shari Redstone, and the boards of each 
company.170 In each case, the companies attempted to defy Mrs. Redstone’s 
attempts to assert her father’s voting power. This resulted in costly battles that 
ended in the departure of both firms’ CEOs and a restructuring of each 
company’s board.171 
Sunsets to prevent this situation can take several forms. A sunset can be 
triggered by the founder’s death or incapacitation.172 For example, a sunset that 
converts high vote shares to single vote shares can be triggered when the founder 
is no longer chief executive officer of the company or no longer involved in the 
day-to-day operations. Again, if dual class is designed to insulate the founder’s 
idiosyncratic vision, that insulation is no longer warranted when the founder is 
not making operational decisions. 
Of course, issuers can voluntarily eliminate their dual class structure upon the 
occurrence of this type of event. For example, Zynga, which was heavily 
criticized for its seventy-to-one dual class structure, converted to a single class 
structure after founder Mark Pincus left as CEO and it was announced he was 
transitioning from chairman of the board to non-executive chairman.173 Zynga’s 
shares rose 1.4% in trading upon this announcement.174 Pincus’s conversion 
decision was voluntary, however. A departure-based sunset would provide 
predictability. In addition, a departure-based sunset is particularly useful if the 
founder’s departure is due to medical reasons or an intra-corporate dispute. 
One might expect sunsets of this type to be commonplace given the 
foreseeable nature of these events, but they are not. Winden documents that only 
forty-eight dual class companies have this type of provision, while ninety-one 
do not.175 It is unclear why these provisions are not more common, but it may 
be a function of the inefficiencies of the IPO market. Given the relatively recent 
growth in the number of issuers that go public with dual class structures, the 
 
169 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 587-88 (citing Emily Steel, Viacom Chiefs Take 
Trust Battle to Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2016, at B1). 
170 Id. at 588. 
171 See, e.g., James B. Stewart, How Dauman Lost the Battle for Viacom, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
25, 2016, at B1 (describing changes at Viacom); Cynthia Littleton, CBS at Crossroads: Board 
Considers Options That Will Influence Decision on Next CEO, VARIETY (Nov. 6, 2018, 4:06 
PM), https://variety.com/2018/tv/news/cbs-board-redstone-moonves-viacom-1203021104/ 
[https://perma.cc/U48H-XBEH] (noting departures of CBS CEO Leslie Moonves and other 
senior executives and challenges facing new board). 
172 Andrew Winden takes the reasonable position that “[d]eath and incapacity sunsets 
should be included in all dual-class charters.” Winden, supra note 17, at 924. 
173 Hufford, supra note 158 (reporting that Pincus “would convert his extra shares into 
Class A shares”). 
174 Id. 
175 Winden, supra note 17, at 946. 
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death or incapacitation of a founder may have limited salience to investors. More 
specifically, the inclusion of these provisions may depend upon the law firm 
utilized at the IPO stage as well as the idiosyncrasies of the founder. 
Moreover, in the case of incapacity, the sunset is often based on the total 
disability of the holder. Lyft for example defines “disability” as: 
the permanent and total disability of such Founder such that such Founder 
is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be 
expected to result in death within 12 months or which has lasted or can be 
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months as 
determined by a licensed medical practitioner . . . .176 
This broad definition preserves the founders’ ability to retain their shares even 
if they are no longer engaged (or able to be engaged) in the operation of the 
company. 
 
4. Other Sunsets 
The foregoing discussion identifies several types of event-based sunset 
provisions that are more closely tied to developments that undercut the original 
justification for a dual class structure than time-based sunsets. The list offered is 
illustrative, not exhaustive; other situations may raise similar concerns and 
warrant treatment through a sunset provision. For example, one could imagine 
creating a dual class structure with a sunset that is triggered by a founder’s 
misconduct, such as a breach of fiduciary duty, although the authors are not 
aware of any issuers that have adopted such a provision.177 
III. MOVING FORWARD 
This analysis of sunsets and dual class stock has a number of implications. 
First, and perhaps most important, the debate over sunsets should be separated 
from the debate over the efficacy and desirability of dual class voting structures. 
Commentators appear to be supporting sunsets as a compromise on the merits 
of dual class, but the value of dual class stock should be debated on its own 
merits. The inclusion or omission of a sunset provision does not resolve the 
question of whether dual class structures are problematic. Instead, policy 
responses to dual class stock should focus on the economic value and social 
welfare effects of dual class. 
In the short term, empirical studies are unlikely to resolve the debate over dual 
class definitively. That feature does not distinguish dual class from many other 
 
176 Lyft, Inc., Amendment No. 2 to Form S-1 Registration Statement, Exhibit 3.2 Restated 
Certificate of Incorporation of Lyft, Inc. at 2 (Mar. 27, 2019). 
177 Winden reports that, in his sample, no issuers have a sunset for breach of fiduciary 
duties. Id. at 852 n.150. 
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corporate governance provisions, such as staggered boards and poison pills.178 
It may be the case that the value of governance provisions is firm-specific and 
that a particular provision is value-enhancing for some firms and value-
decreasing for others.179 Alternatively, further experience with dual class 
structures may clarify the extent to which they add value by solidifying control 
with a visionary and value-creating entrepreneur,180 or whether they 
counterproductively entrench that control in circumstances in which the vision 
of the entrepreneur declines or is lost.181 
In this scenario, sunsets should not be understood as a regulatorily imposed 
fix to minimize the duration of a problematic governance structure, but as a 
feature that offers the potential to align the use of dual class stock with value 
creation. In this regard, there should be more thorough and rigorous thinking, 
both about the use of sunsets and about the form that such sunsets should take. 
In particular, this Article argues that the growing effort to force dual class 
issuers to adopt time-based sunsets is inappropriate. Time-based sunsets should 
not be a necessary precondition for the use of dual class stock, and calls for the 
imposition of such a requirement through regulation, exchange listing 
requirements, or restrictions on index inclusion are misguided. Although time-
based sunsets appear to reflect a compromise position, as this Article 
demonstrates they are poorly tailored to addressing the potential limitations of 
the dual class structure. At the same time, time-based sunsets may lead to 
complacency about dual class structures and encourage investors and the 
markets to accept dual class where its potential value is questionable. 
To date, however, this Article’s analysis suggests that investors and the 
market do not know enough about either dual class or sunsets to use regulation, 
index requirements, or stock exchange rules to force companies into time-based 
sunsets. Instead, we should allow private ordering, but encourage greater 
attention to the specific developments that are likely to erode the potential value 
of dual class, such as dilution, transfer, disability, and departure. There is 
particular value to market participants working to develop norms and standards 
around the types of sunsets that the market should demand of dual class issuers. 
This Article calls for lawyers to be more capacious in drafting sunset provisions 
and for institutional investors to pay greater attention to the specific features of 
sunset provisions as well as the manner in which they operate in the context of 
a specific firm. Finally, to the extent that issuers adopt retention votes as a 
 
178 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. 
ECON. 409, 409 (2005) (reporting that firms with staggered boards have lower values); K.J. 
Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Long-Term 
Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 422 (2017) (concluding that staggered boards 
can, in appropriate circumstances, increase long-term firm value). 
179 See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of 
the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 697 (2016) (finding evidence that “governance 
provisions have heterogeneous effects depending upon firm-specific characteristics”). 
180 Kim & Michaely, supra note 75, at 5-6. 
181 Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 16, at 602. 
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component of their dual class structures, proxy advisory firms, such as 
Institutional Shareholder Services, need to develop principles by which to 
evaluate whether retention or termination of a dual class structure is warranted. 
Finally, to an extent, the debate over dual class and sunsets has a tendency to 
overlook broader questions about the role and purpose of voting rights in 
publicly traded companies. By increasing the relative voting power of the 
founder, dual class structures operate to limit the voting power of public 
shareholders. As such, they raise questions about the importance of voting rights, 
the issues on which shareholders can and should exercise voting authority, and 
the viability of alternatives to voting—such as exit, litigation, and engagement—
for limiting the power of controlling shareholders.182 
Examination of these issues is critical as the composition of the investor base 
continues to evolve. Large institutional investors, many of which rely primarily 
on index-based investment strategies, own an increasing percentage of publicly 
traded securities.183 Commentators debate the incentives of these investors,184 
the extent to which they engage in informed voting decisions,185 and the degree 
to which their investment objectives are subject to short-termism.186 The policies 
and procedures by which these investors exercise their voting power may vary 
depending on the subject matter of the vote. 
In a stylized world, the effect of dual class on issuer control can be modeled 
in terms of voting outcomes.187 In the real world, the impact of dual class is less 
clear. By way of example, after a series of scandals involving Uber, 
commentators warned that shareholders lacked the power to restrain or remove 
then-CEO Travis Kalanick because of the voting power he held by virtue of 
Uber’s dual class structure.188 Nonetheless, in the face of pressure from Uber’s 
major investors, Kalanick resigned, and Uber’s board subsequently removed the 
 
182 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 54-55), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=3227113 [https://per 
ma.cc/55ZE-M6ZS] (arguing that shareholder collaboration has largely supplanted 
competition between shareholders and managers for control). 
183 See, e.g., Fisch, Hamdani & Solomon, supra note 21, at 1 (describing increasing 
institutional ownership of public equity markets). 
184 Id. (arguing that passive investors have incentives to support governance changes that 
reduce risk of underperformance). 
185 See, e.g., Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. 
L. 493, 493 (2018) (claiming that passive investors make uninformed voting decisions). 
186 See, e.g., Robert Anderson IV, The Long and Short of Corporate Governance, 23 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 19, 26-27 (2015) (describing academic and media debate over time horizons 
of institutional investors). 
187 See Edelman, Jiang & Thomas, supra note 99, at 48-49 (providing example of this 
approach). 
188 See, e.g., Jessi Hempel, Why Uber Won’t Fire Its CEO, WIRED (Apr. 4, 2017, 12:00 
AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/why-uber-wont-fire-its-ceo/ (observing that Uber’s 
dual class structure limited shareholders’ ability to restrain Kalanick’s exercise of power). 
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dual class structure.189 Uber’s dual class structure did not, in the end, prevent the 
company from responding to a founder who was limiting corporate value.190 
CONCLUSION 
The increasing adoption of dual class structures has generated concern. In 
response, some commentators have called for the adoption of sunset provisions 
to limit the duration of the dual class structure. This Article argues that 
compulsory sunsets, and time-based sunsets in particular, are an inappropriate 
response to the potential problems of dual class stock. Although sunsets tied to 
particular events that are likely to reduce the value of dual class—such as 
dilution, transfer, or departure of the founder—may prove valuable, experience 
with such sunsets is limited to date. Consequently, although this Article 
encourages issuers and investors to experiment with the development and use of 
event-based sunsets, it suggests, at present, that experimentation take place 
through private ordering. 
 
189 Uber ‘Dual’ Comes to an End, AUSTRALIAN INST. OF CO. DIRS. (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/membership/the-boardroom-report/volume-15-issue-
10/uber-dual-comes-to-an-end [https://perma.cc/R8X2-7SGD]. 
190 Uber may be an exception. Anecdotally, the authors have been informed that there was 
a “loophole” in Uber’s dual class structure that allowed a particular venture capital investor 
to convert a preferred instrument to dilute Kalanick below 50% control of the dual class and 
force a successful conversion vote. Investors used this leverage to obtain Kalanick’s 
agreement to the conversion. 
